The Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS) — launched in 2003 as the government's primary mechanism for acquiring farmland for redistribution — became one of South Africa's most devastating examples of systemic corruption masquerading as transformation.

**The Farm-Flipping Scheme**

The corruption followed a consistent pattern across provinces. Politically connected individuals would identify farms in financial distress, purchase them at below-market prices, then sell them to the government at substantially inflated valuations. In many cases, the same individuals would then return as "strategic partners" under the Recapitalisation and Development Programme (RADP), accessing further government funding.

A Mail & Guardian investigation found that 44% of PLAS beneficiaries were urban-based "business individuals, taxi/transport operators, former state bureaucrats, and local politicians" — people with no farming background, no intention to farm, and in some cases no knowledge they had been named as beneficiaries.

In one case documented by the SIU, a department official named his own family as beneficiaries. In others, alleged beneficiaries had never visited the farms allocated to them.

**R12 Billion, 2.9 Million Hectares — Most of It Wasted**

Between 2003 and August 2022, the state acquired 2.9 million hectares through PLAS at a cost of approximately R12 billion. A peer-reviewed Frontiers study found significant provincial variation in price gaps — especially in KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng, and the Eastern Cape — suggesting sellers exploited information asymmetries and state urgency.

The AG identified R580 million in unreconciled RADP disbursements through the Agricultural Land Holding Account and significant irregular expenditure from non-compliance with supply chain management prescripts.

**75% Failure Rate**

Of 529 PLAS farms selected for R3.4 billion in post-settlement support under RADP, 397 (75%) are either subsistence-level or not productive at all. Crop production decreased by 79% on average since conversion to land reform. More than half of beneficiaries reported no substantial production.

The DALRRD itself conceded that RADP "did not have a significant impact on productivity."

**Who Paid the Price**

The intended beneficiaries — historically disadvantaged South Africans seeking access to productive agricultural land — were the ultimate victims. Farmworkers were left vulnerable to what Corruption Watch called "fly-by-night crony capitalists and corrupt state bureaucrats" who captured production support, stripped farm assets, and abandoned farms.

The SIU examined 148 land reform projects and found one in four was fraudulent. It recommended 42 individuals for prosecution. As of 2019, only one department official had been convicted.